

PROPOSED SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE HEARINGS

October 23 -- Overview of Administration actions on counterintelligence and security, including recent decisions and topics under review.

Administration representative

Accompanied by: Steve Garfinkel, Director,
Information Security Oversight Office

FBI, CIA, DoD, NSA, State, IC Staff
representatives

October 30 -- Technical counterintelligence and security:
strategy and planning.

Administration representative

Don Latham, Assistant Secretary of Defense, C³I
[redacted] Director of Communications Security, NSA

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[redacted] Chairman, DCI Security Committee

STAT

[redacted] Director of Security, CIA

STAT

Bob Lamb, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration

November 6 -- Counterespionage in the 1990s.

Administration representative

William Webster, Director, FBI
Jim Geer, Assistant Director for Intelligence, FBI

John McMahon, Deputy DCI
[redacted] Chief, CI Staff, CIA

STAT

Jack Donnelly, Director, DoD CI and Investigative Programs
Service, DIA, and NSA representatives

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November 13 -- Personnel and information security

Administration representative

General Richard Stilwell
Britt Snider, Director, DoD CI and Security Policy
Service representatives



Chairman, DCI Security Committee

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Director, Office of Personnel Management

Steve Garfinkel, Director, Information Security
Oversight Office

December 4 -- Counterespionage and foreign policy; State
Department security

Administration representative

Secretary Shultz
Bob Lamb, Assistant Secretary for Administration
Jim Nolan, Director, Office of Foreign Missions

PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT, VICE CHAIRMAN
AM V. ROTH, JR., DELAWARE
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE
ORRIN MATCH, UTAH
FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
CHIC HECHT, NEVADA
MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY

LLOYD BENTSEN, TEXAS
SAM MUNN, GEORGIA
THOMAS F. EAGLETON, MISSOURI
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA
DAVID L. BOREN, OKLAHOMA
BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO
ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIO

BERNARD F. McMAHON, STAFF DIRECTOR
ERIC D. NEWSON, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

#85-3118

September 13, 1985

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bud:

The Chairman and Vice Chairman have asked me to give you some idea of the hearings the Committee plans to have this Fall on counterintelligence and security. As they indicate in their letter to the President, we see those hearings as part of a collaborative enterprise to develop an agreed agenda for immediate actions and long-term decisions.

We hope to work with the NSC staff and the official selected to represent the Administration at the hearings to review all the various proposals for improving counterintelligence and security programs. The hearings will cover information, personnel, industrial, physical, communications, and computer security, as well as counterintelligence capabilities and operational security for intelligence collection. In addition, we will look carefully at the classification system, because more effective security measures may depend on new solutions to the longstanding problem of overclassification. We want to consider steps that can be taken by administrative action and those that require legislation. We are also reviewing security for the Committee and the Senate as a whole.

Attached is a proposed hearing schedule. We have set aside time for at least five hearings, and those dates are firm. The topics and witnesses reflect our best judgment of the Committee's needs, but we would be happy to consider adjustments recommended by the NSC staff and the Administration

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
September 13, 1985
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representative. The hearings will be supplemented by ongoing consultations with relevant officials. In preparation, we would appreciate your arranging for us to have Volume II of the latest National Assessment of the Hostile Intelligence Services Threat and U.S. Countermeasures, which identifies policy options that we should be able to consider jointly.

The Members and staff of the Committee appreciate all the help we have received from your staff and other Executive branch officials. We are confident that, by the end of the year, the Committee will have a report to the Senate that reflects credit on all those involved in this process. Your staff is invited to attend the hearings, and we look forward to working together.

Sincerely,



Bernard F. McMahon
Staff Director

BFM:rn

Attachment

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APPEARANCE OF

DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR THOMAS E. DUHADWAY
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE

October 30, 1985

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Classified by: 859
Declassify on: OADR

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GOOD MORNING MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING WITH YOU TODAY THE CURRENT PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. I WOULD LIKE TO BRIEFLY MENTION SOME OF THE SIGNIFICANT ISSUES FACING OUR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM TODAY AND THE INITIATIVES THE FBI IS TAKING TO ADDRESS THEM.

THE FBI BELIEVES THAT EFFECTIVE COORDINATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND AGENCIES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ARE ESSENTIAL FOR EFFECTIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS. IN THE EARLY 1980S, THE ADMINISTRATION REORGANIZED THE NATIONAL LEVEL STRUCTURE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RESULTING IN CREATION OF A SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP FOR INTELLIGENCE (SIG-I) AND TWO SPECIALIZED INTERAGENCY GROUPS, ONE FOR COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (IG/CI) AND ONE FOR PROTECTIVE SECURITY AND COUNTERMEASURES (IG/CM). AS THE AGENCY PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, THE FBI CHAIRS THE IG/CI, AND SENIOR FBI OFFICIALS PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE NATIONAL LEVEL STRUCTURE FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS. THE FBI BELIEVES THAT THE CURRENT NATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY, HAS SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED THE COORDINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND HAS MADE THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICYMAKERS.

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CONCURRENTLY, THE FBI SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDED ITS ROLE IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. SINCE FISCAL YEAR (FY) 82, THE FBI HAS MORE THAN DOUBLED ITS DEDICATION OF SPECIAL AGENTS TO SUPPORT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SPECIAL PROJECTS FROM 64 TO OVER 130 SPECIAL AGENTS TODAY.

RECENTLY, THE FBI DETAILED REPRESENTATIVES TO PERMANENT ADVISORY POSITIONS WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA), THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS (OFM), THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC). THESE FBI REPRESENTATIVES ARE INVOLVED IN SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS AND PROVIDE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXPERTISE AND ADVICE TO THESE ORGANIZATIONS. IN ADDITION, THE FBI HAS REPRESENTATIVES ASSIGNED PART-TIME TO OVER FIFTY OTHER INTERAGENCY BOARDS AND COMMITTEES.

THE FBI BELIEVES THAT ITS EXPANDED ROLE IN THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS IMPROVED THE COORDINATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD.

EFFECTIVE COOPERATION AND COORDINATION ARE ESSENTIAL BECAUSE OVER THE LAST DECADE THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN THE NUMBER OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS POSTED TO THE UNITED STATES AND IN THE NUMBER OF VISITORS FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE FBI HAS OBSERVED AN INCREASED AGGRESSIVENESS IN HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

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IN RESPONSE TO THE GROWING INTELLIGENCE THREAT, THE FBI HAS REQUESTED AND HAS RECEIVED, WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS, SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN OUR BUDGET FOR FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS (FCI). OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS, THE FBI'S FCI BUDGET HAS INCREASED FROM JUST OVER 100 MILLION DOLLARS IN FY 82 TO OVER 230 MILLION DOLLARS TODAY. INCREASES HAVE BEEN ACROSS THE BOARD IN ALL MAJOR PROGRAM EFFORTS, WITH OUR DEDICATED TECHNICAL PROGRAM SHOWING THE MOST SIGNIFICANT GROWTH FROM UNDER 5 MILLION IN FY 82 TO OVER 56 MILLION IN FY 86. FBI PERSONNEL DEDICATED TO THE FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM HAVE INCREASED FROM 2700 IN FY 82 TO 4200 IN FY 86, AN INCREASE OF OVER 50 PERCENT. MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, THE FBI HAS ALLOCATED ITS RESOURCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH WELL-DEFINED PRIORITIES AND PROGRAMS, AND AS NECESSARY, HAS REALLOCATED RESOURCES TO RESPOND TO CHANGES IN THE HOSTILE THREAT.

THE INCREASE IN OUR COMPLEMENT OF SPECIAL AGENTS, LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS, AND SURVEILLANCE PERSONNEL, IN CONCERT WITH IMPROVEMENTS IN OUR TECHNICAL COVERAGE, HAVE ENHANCED OUR ABILITY TO MONITOR AND DISRUPT THE ACTIVITIES AND MOVEMENTS OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS IN THE UNITED STATES. INCREASES IN OUR COMPLEMENT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS, INCLUDING ANALYSTS ASSIGNED TO FIELD OFFICES, HAVE IMPROVED THE FBI'S ABILITY TO ASSESS HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ASSISTED OUR INVESTIGATIONS OF ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS.

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RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRESENCE, ACTIVITIES, AND MOVEMENTS OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ARE ESSENTIAL TO IMPROVING OUR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PROGRAMS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S OFM HAS FORMULATED PLANS AND IMPLEMENTED EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO RESTRICT THE MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF SELECTED HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES AND TO PROMOTE DIPLOMATIC RECIPROCITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS, PARTICULARLY THE SOVIET UNION. THE FBI'S OFM REPRESENTATIVES PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE FORMULATION OF OFM POLICIES AND PLANS AND ENSURE THAT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONCERNS ARE FACTORED INTO OFM ACTIONS.

THE FBI HAS ALSO SUPPORTED THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE'S INITIATIVES TO RESTRICT THE PRESENCE, MOVEMENTS, AND ACTIVITIES OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS IN THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING THE LEAHY-COHEN AND ROTH AMENDMENTS TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S AUTHORIZATION ACT PASSED IN JULY. THESE AMENDMENTS, WHICH CALL FOR SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCY IN DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE TRAVEL OF CERTAIN UNITED NATIONS (UN) SECRETARIAT PERSONNEL (SPECIFICALLY AIMED AT SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF THE UN SECRETARIAT FOR INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS), WILL ASSIST OUR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

IN ADDITION TO THE SERIOUS CONCERNS OVER HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS, THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAVE

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IDENTIFIED TWO OTHER MAJOR PROBLEMS THAT ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS: ACTIVE MEASURES AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. THE SOVIETS USE ACTIVE MEASURES (I.E., COVERT INFLUENCE AND DISINFORMATION OPERATIONS) TO ADVANCE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AIMS, INFLUENCE THE POLICIES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, DISCREDIT U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND POLICIES, AND ISOLATE THE UNITED STATES FROM ITS ALLIES AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

IN RESPONSE TO THESE OPERATIONS, THE ADMINISTRATION ESTABLISHED THE INTERAGENCY ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP, CHAIRED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT, TO MONITOR AND EXPOSE SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THROUGH ITS REPRESENTATIVES ON THE WORKING GROUP, THE FBI WORKS CLOSELY WITH OTHER AGENCIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE FBI HAS PROVIDED INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT AND INFORMATION TO THE WORKING GROUP IN AN EFFORT TO EXPOSE SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD AND TO EDUCATE THE PUBLIC AND PRESS ON THESE OPERATIONS.

THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THE SOVIET UNION, ALSO POSES A SERIOUS THREAT TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS. IN RESPONSE TO THIS ISSUE, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS PLACED ADDITIONAL CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF TECHNOLOGY AND HAS ESTABLISHED SEVERAL INTERAGENCY COMMITTEES TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. FBI REPRESENTATIVES ARE ASSIGNED TO MANY OF THESE INTERAGENCY COMMITTEES AND THROUGH OUR

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INVESTIGATIONS WE SUPPORT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO HALT THE ILLEGAL FLOW OF TECHNOLOGY. THE FBI WORKS CLOSELY WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND THE U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE WHICH HAVE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR STEMMING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF DUAL USE TECHNOLOGY.

TO ALERT THE INDUSTRIAL AND PUBLIC SECTOR TO THE THREAT POSED BY THE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, INCLUDING THE PROBLEMS OF ILLEGAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, THE FBI INITIATED A PROGRAM IN 1978 CALLED THE DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AWARENESS OR DECA. IN THIS PROGRAM, THE FBI IDENTIFIES DEFENSE CONTRACTORS HOLDING CLASSIFIED U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND INITIATES CONTACTS WITH THESE FIRMS TO ALERT THEM TO THE THREAT POSED BY HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. OVER 15,000 CONTRACTORS HAVE BEEN CONTACTED SINCE THE PROGRAM WAS ESTABLISHED. OUR CONTACTS HAVE RANGED FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH COMPANY SECURITY OFFICERS TO LENGTHY PRESENTATIONS TO LARGE GROUPS OF EMPLOYEES. THESE CONTACTS ARE AUGMENTED BY PUBLIC ADDRESSES GIVEN BY THE DIRECTOR, FBI EXECUTIVES, AND SPECIAL AGENTS IN THE FIELD TO INDUSTRIAL, PROFESSIONAL, AND MANAGEMENT GROUPS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

IN ADDITION TO THE ISSUES I HAVE JUST MENTIONED, THE FBI SUPPORTS THE CURRENT PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO IMPROVE PROTECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THE STILWELL COMMISSION STUDY ON DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

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SECURITY POLICIES, THE INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE TASK FORCE, THE STEPS TO IMPLEMENT NSDD-145, AND THE SETTING OF NEW LIMITS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE FBI ALSO SUPPORTS THE INITIATIVES AND ACTIONS OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE CONCERNING ESPIONAGE AND SECURITY PROBLEMS. THESE INCLUDE THE SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL FOR FY 85 TO ENHANCE SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES AT U.S. EMBASSIES AND OTHER FACILITIES ABROAD, THE LEAHY-COHEN AND ROTH AMENDMENTS WHICH I PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, AND HEARINGS EXAMINING U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS.

THE FBI BELIEVES THAT EFFORTS TO IMPROVE OUR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS IN RECENT YEARS HAVE RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS AGAINST HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. SINCE 1982, THE FBI HAS ARRESTED 25 INDIVIDUALS FOR ESPIONAGE. THERE HAVE BEEN 20 CONVICTIONS AND IN FIVE CASES PROSECUTION IS PENDING. THIS FOUR-YEAR TOTAL IS THE HIGHEST RATE OF ARREST AND CONVICTION OF ESPIONAGE AGENTS SINCE WORLD WAR II. IN ADDITION, SINCE 1982, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS FORMALLY OR INFORMALLY EXPELLED OVER 25 HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS FROM THE UNITED STATES BASED ON INFORMATION DEVELOPED BY THE FBI. IN RECENT YEARS, THE FBI HAS ALSO ACHIEVED CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS IN CONTROLLED DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS AND RECRUITMENTS-IN-PLACE AGAINST HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

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ALTHOUGH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAVE MADE GREAT STRIDES IN IMPROVING OUR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PROGRAMS, WE MUST CONTINUE TO REEVALUATE AND REASSESS OUR OPERATIONS. THEREFORE, WE WELCOME YOUR COMMITTEE HEARINGS AND FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT COORDINATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS, AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AGENCIES ARE ESSENTIAL TO EFFECTIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS.

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STATEMENT BY
ROBERT E. LAMB
BEFORE THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Wednesday, October 30, 1985, 10:30 a.m.

Two events over the past year have dominated discussions about the State Department's security programs. I am speaking of the September 1984 bombing of our Embassy Annex in Beirut and the discovery of implants in several of our electric typewriters in Moscow. These two events have highlighted areas where we needed to improve our security programs; they have also overshadowed our past and ongoing successes.

Even before the September 1984 Beirut bombing or the discovery of the implants, the Secretary had formed an Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, chaired by retired Admiral Bobby Inman, to take a hard look at our security programs overseas and to recommend improvements. The Secretary wanted an unvarnished assessment of our security. He got what he asked for.

The Inman Panel submitted its final report in June

with 106 sweeping recommendations covering, among other things, physical security, technical security, interagency and intradepartmental coordination, counter-terrorism programs, accountability, and a security construction program. These recommendations form the core of the comprehensive security enhancement program we are proposing; the legislative and budgetary packages for this program are now undergoing OMB review before being transmitted shortly to the Congress.

Besides requesting the funds to finance this program -- \$4.2 billion over five budget years -- the proposed legislation would establish within the Department a highly disciplined corps of professional security officers in a Diplomatic Security Service. This Service would be part of a new Bureau of Diplomatic Security. This reorganization would enable us to consolidate the Department's security-related functions and greatly clarify lines of responsibility within the Department. It is also an important step towards building a diplomatic security service which could meet our growing security challenges overseas. The proposed legislation would also establish Accountability Review Boards in the event of incidents involving serious injury, loss of life, or destruction of property.

Under this security program we propose to rebuild 62 of our facilities which are most vulnerable to terrorists and spies; we will substantially renovate about 43 other facilities. We will also enhance our technical security countermeasures, training, local guard programs, residential security, perimeter security, and coordination. We will take on added responsibilities for protecting foreign diplomats and visiting foreign officials in the United States.

These are dramatic initiatives. They are also essential if we are truly serious about making our personnel and facilities overseas safe from the variety of threats they face daily.

But this supplemental request is only part of our overall security program. Meanwhile we are building and strengthening our existing security programs at a rate which is unprecedented in the Department of State, or, perhaps, in the U.S. Government. Our accomplishments have been many, but have not attracted the attention they have merited. For example:

-- We are nearly doubling the number of professional

security officers assigned overseas.

- We are more than doubling the number of security engineering officers.**
- We are increasing by 20 percent the number of Marine Security Guards attached to our posts overseas. We are sending Marine Security Guard detachments to 37 posts which previously had no Marine protection.**
- We are increasing by one third the number of Seabees attached to the State Department. This welcome influx of Seabees will enable us to complete many of our essential and sensitive security construction projects more rapidly.**
- We are dispatching Mobile Training Teams overseas to train our personnel to protect themselves in high-threat environments. These teams also train our local guards -- now numbering over 8,000 worldwide.**
- We have nearly doubled the size of our fully armored vehicle fleet worldwide. By the end of Fiscal Year 1986, we will have provided a fully armored vehicle to every chief of mission and principal officer in Europe**

(EUR), the Middle East (NEA), and Latin America (ARA).

-- In 1985 alone we made physical security improvements at 177 overseas posts at a cost of \$53.9 million.

We have an effective security program now. We are proud of our accomplishments. We are, however, not overawed by our successes; nor are we discouraged by our setbacks.

Our personnel overseas are on the front lines of the fight against terrorism and espionage. They need and deserve the best security we can provide. That, in a nutshell, is our commitment and our goal.